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Institutional Reform in Eastern Europe:
Evolution or Design?
Roman Frydman and Andrzej Rapaczynski*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most recent studies of privatization in Eastern Europe
focus on its impact on individual enterprises.' In our previous
work, we examined this issue from the viewpoint of the future
corporate governance structure in Eastern E ~ r o p eThe
. ~ aggregate effects of privatization have been largely neglected, perhaps on the assumption that they have no particular bearing
on how privatization is to be effected at the enterprise level. It
is very important, however, to link the discussion of the various
approaches to large-scale privatization with a consideration of
other obstacles in the transition to a market economy. These
* Roman Frydman is an Associate Professor of Economics at New York University. Andrzej Rapaczynski is a Professor of Law at Columbia University.
We would like to thank the following persons for stimulating conversations on
the topics related to this paper: Bruce A. Ackerman, Fabrizio Coricelli, Irena
Grosfeld, William P. McCauley, Edmund Phelps, George Soros, Stanislaw Wellisz,
and Charles Wilson. Central European University provided generous support for a
broader research project in Eastern Europe, of which this paper is a part. Martin
Gargiulo and Markus Kreuzer were very helpful with their research assistance.
Rachel Denber and Tim Christenfeld provided editorial assistance.
1. See OLMER BLANCHARD
ET AL., REFORM
IN EASTERNEUROPE(1991); hena
Grosfeld, Privatization of State Enterprises in Eastern Europe: The Search for a
Market Environment, 6 E. EUR. POL. & SOCIETIES 142 (1991); David Lipton &
Jeffrey Sachs, Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland, in BROOKINGS
PAPERSON ECON.ACTIVll"Y 293 (William C. Brainard & George L. Perry, eds.,
1990); Irena Grosfeld & Paul Hare, Privatization in Hungary, Poland and
Czechoslovakia (Mar. 1991) (mimeo).
2.
See Roman Frydman & Andrzej Rapaczynski, Markets and Institutions in
Large-Scale Privatizations. An Approach to Economic and Social !fransformations in
Eastern Europe, in REFORMING
CENTRAL
AND EASTERNEUROPEANECONOMIES:
INTTTIAc RESULTSAND CHALLENGES
(Vittorio Corbo & Fabrizio Coricelli eds., The
World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1991); Roman Frydman & Andrzej Rapaczynski,
Privatization and Corporate Governance in Eastern Europe; Can a Market Economy
Be Designed?, in CENTRALAND EASTERNEUROPE:ROADSTO GROWTH(Georg
Winckler ed., International Monetary Fund and Austrian Natiocal Bank,
Washington, D.C., 1992).
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obstacles, which include the weakness of existing capital stock,
the absence of a banking system and the absence of capital
markets, can be overcome through the use of a combination of
design and reliance on market mechanisms. This combination
can provide a successful transition to a market economy.

As a natural reaction to the dismal failure of planning in
Eastern Europe, there is a tendency among both Eastern European and Western commentators to disparage reform proposals
involving significant s t a t e activism. Instead, these
commentators favor solutions which rely on the spontaneity of
economic developments. If the criticized reform proposals
advocated long-term state involvement in the economic life of
the region, the commentators' skepticism would be fully justified. However, this skepti&sm may be stifling to the extent it
discourages reformers from making significant choices
concerning the forces that will fill the vacuum created by the
state's withdrawal from the management of the postCommunist economies. Paradoxically, Eastern Europe cannot
rely solely on market forces to initiate the transition to a
spontaneously fundioning market economy. Indeed, the only
force powerful enough to set the market forces in motion is the
very state that is supposed to remove itself from the picture.
Thus, what passes for spontaneity may ofien amount to a
simple entrenchment of the status quo.
The East European economies are not virgin territory,
where capitalism could evolve gradually. On the contrary,
Eastern Europe has a very specific industrial infrastructure, a
product of the command economy. In Eastern Europe, typical
enterprises are extremely large3 and have developed links that
will be costly to sever. Thus, a mere withdrawal of the state
would leave intact the established special interest groups.
These include the old management chosen for its loyalty rather
than its competence, a labor force intent on resisting any
changes that may endanger its job security, and a network of
monopolies. All of these groups stand to lose from the
institution of a truly competitive market. What is needed is
genuine reform: that is, a design which establishes a new

3.
For example, in Poland 100 enterprises are responsible for 40% of industrial production.
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system of property rights and, above all, a new institutional
arrangement of control and supervision over the performance of
managers and labor. Design is thus necessary to overcome the
inertia of the ancien r 4 g i m and to initiate a process of
restructuring and change.

Choosing an appropriate design for each of the Eastern
European countries is a complex task, especially when one
considers the various institutions of capitalism. These capitalist
institutions include corporations, banks,institutional investors,
and stock exchanges. Thus, one can say that there is not one,
but many market economies. Each has its own peculiar mode of
operation, financing, and complex institutional interrelationships, which shape how managers respond to signals conveyed
by the market. In some countries, such as Germany and Japan,
corporate governance includes a significant role for banks and
other financial institutions; other countries, such as Britain
and the United States, rely on the stock market to discipline
corporate managers. However, in both systems the institutions
of control have evolved slowly, and the resulting economic order
is exceedingly complex."
With regard to privatization, Eastern Europe's most
signdicant challenge is to make diffcult choices concerning the
direction of institutional development and to set in motion the
forces which can fill the gap leR by the state's withdrawal.
However, it is important to note that the reformers operate
Not only do they face an
under a tremendous handi~ap.~
extremely uncertain future, which makes all planning risky,
but they also lack solid information about the existing state of
affairs. Thus, they run the risk of unintentionally exposing

4.
For comparisons among the different corporate governance systems, see
Julian F'ranks & Colin Mayer, Capital Markets and Corporate Control: A Study of
France, Germany and the UK, 5 ECON.POL'Y191-231 (1990). For a discussion of
MODERN
CAPITALISM
the German system and its history, see ANDREW SHONF~LD,
239 (1965); Josef Esser, Bank Power in West Germany Revised, W . EUR.POL.,Oct.
1990, at 17; and Jiirgen Kocka, The Rise of Moden Industrial Enterprise in Germany, in MANAGE= HIERARCHIES 77-116 (Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. & Herman
Daems eds., 1980). For Japan, see THE ANATOMY
OF JAPANESEBUSINESS(Kazuo
Sato & Yasuo Hoshimo eds., 1984); RAYMOND W. GOLDSMITH,
THE FINANCIAL
DEVELOPMENT
OF JAPAN,1868-1977 (1983); JOHANNES
HIRSCHMEIER
& TSUNEW(0
Yw, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF JAPANESEBUSINESS1600-1980 (2d ed. 1981).
5. In our view, this is a crucial aspect of the transition.
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weak spots of the existing system to reform shocks which they
may not be capable of absorbing. The only way to proceed,
therefore, is to combine the element of design with a reliance
on an array of market mechanisms that will correct the inevitable flaws in the design.
In order to successfdly combine market mechanisms and
policy intervention, the design must have two basic formal
features. First, it must reduce the unacceptably high level of
uncertainty regarding the current situation. To do this the
design must reveal as much information as possible in the
early stages of the reform process. Policy makers can then use
this information to refine and modify the design and avoid
commitments which may have serious unforeseen
consequences. Second, the design must contain self-corrective
mechanisms that will spontaneously adjust the reform system.
These self-corrective mechanisms are necessary since it is
impossible to foresee all of the potential problems. These two
formal features distinguish all successful institutional
innovations from conventional planning schemes and should
represent a general principle of institutional reform.
FRAMEWORK FOR MASS
IV. A GENERAL

PRIVATIZATIONPROPOSALS
The discussion in this section focuses on the most
important Eastern European privatization schemes, namely,
those which propose to transfer the beneficial ownership of a
large portion of state enterprises to the general population (or a
large fraction of it), while concentrating control functions in a
small number of intermediary institution^.^
In most privatization proposals of this kind,? the
intermediary institutions function as holding companies or
mutual funds, although some plans foresee a role for pension
funds and other institutional investors. The intermediaries
usually contain an essential foreign component. Foreign
Schemes of this kind are now being prepared in Poland and Czechoslovakia.
6.
Given the slow progress of conventional privatizations in Hungary, it may be only
a matter of time before related solutions are developed there as well.
7.
For an example of such a plan, see Roman F'rydman & Andrzej
Rapaczynski, Privatization in Poland: A New Proposal (June 1990) (mimeo). For a
revised version of this paper published in Polish, see Roman Frydman & Andrzej
Prywatyzacje:
Nowa
hpozycja
Ptzemian
Rapaczynski, Splywatyzowac
Wkmwsciowych w Polsce, Res publica (Sept., 1990). For other proposals, see
BLANCHARD
ET AL., supra note 1.
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financial institutions commonly obtain management contracts
for the newly created funds. These proposals usually envisage
the conversion of state enterprises into joint-stock companies,
with the intermediaries becoming legal owners of a large
portion of their shares (some plans reserve a block of shares of
the privatized enterprises for the state or distribute a portion
of the shares directly to the population). The shares of the
intermediaries themselves are in turn owned by individuals
who acquire them free of charge or for a nominal fee.
The use of vouchers is often contemplated for this purpose.
Individuals can use vouchers to purchase shares of the intermediary which they would like to own or t o allow the
intermediaries t o purchase shares of specific privatized
companies for their portfolio. Thus, vouchers allow individuals
and intermediaries to determine their own ownership interests.
The advantages of these types of privatization proposals
(although there are significant differences among them) include
the following: the speed with which they can be implemented,
the avoidance or lessening of problems associated with the
valuation of the enterprises, the legitimization of the privatization scheme through a distribution of the national wealth
among the population, thus ensuring a degree of equality, and,
above all, a facilitation of the restructuring process through the
institution of an effective mechanism for control of
management performance. Other advantages include the
possibility of a rapid development of a financial infrastructure
and a link to outside sources of capital and expertise.
Despite the numerous advantages inherent in these types
of privatization proposals, significant economic and political
obstacles must be addressed. The following section analyzes
these potential obstacles and recommends possible solutions.

V.

OBSTACLESIN THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET

ECONOMY
The transition to a market economy faces a number of
serious obstacles. A large portion of the existing capital stock in
the Eastern European economies may turn out to be nonviable
in a competitive market environment. Moreover, and perhaps
more importantly, the governments of the Eastern European
countries lack reliable information regarding the state of the
capital stock. This makes effective policy planning extremely
difficult and poses the realistic threat of an avalanche of
bankruptcies. These problems may be compounded by extensive

6
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interfirm links which have been developed in the command
economy.
In addition to practical problems, the transition to a
market economy also presents serious political problems. The
reformers must balance an acute need for investment capital
and a t the same time avoid relying extensively on foreign
capital or ownership. Thus, the new economy must not only
satisfy economic imperatives, but must also avoid destabilizing
the fledgling political systems of the new Eastern Europe.

A. The Allocation of Capital Stock: The Lack
of Information and the Speed of Privatization
The various mass privatization proposals envisage different
methods for distributing the shares of the privatized enterprises to the intermediary institutions. Some proposals advocate a
mechanical or administrative allocation. This would be accomplished either by giving each intermediary an equal number of
shares in each company to be privatized, or by dividing all of
the companies into several groups of "roughly equal valuen8
and allocating each group (perhaps a t random) to one fund.
Other proposals envisage a specially designed auction as an
allocative mechanism, with the intermediaries bidding for the
shares of the privatized companies using vouchers or investment points.
1. The lack of information

In evaluating the relative merits of the alternative methods of allocation, sufficient consideration must be given to the
nature of the capital stock of the post-Communist economies.
This is because the perverse evolution of the planned economy
precluded the weeding out of nonviable enterprises and contributed to the creation of enterprises that had no ratio essendi.
The natural temptation of Eastern European policymakers
(and, surprisingly enough, many Western analysts as well) is to
try to ensure that the state does not find itself bereR of all
valuable enterprises, left only with the worthless scrap of the

8.
We put this phrase in quotation marks because we believe that the task of
assigning even rough values to state enterprises before privatization is truly
Herculean (or perhaps rather Sisyphean). The idea that anyone would be able to
assign values to several hundred companies within a span of a few months appears to us entirely unrealistic.
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Communist inheritance. A mechanical or administrative allocation of shares among the intermediaries would prevent this by
forcing the intermediaries to accept the weakest enterprises
along with the strongest. The effect of this tempting move,
however, may turn out to be unexpectedly harmful.
Since a large part of the country's capital stock may be
nonviable, rapidly exposing a large number of enterprises t o
the rigors of a hard budget constraint and a truly competitive
environment may result in a spate of bankruptcies, leading to a
swift fall in production and a rapid rise in unemployment. This,
in turn, may destabilize the political situation and endanger
the whole reform process. Therefore, one of the main problems
with the schemes of rapid privatization is that, not knowing
the real state of the capital stock, it is impossible for the government t o predict whether moving into a market economy will
produce this devastating avalanche effect.
Suppose, then, that using an administrative or mechanical
allocation scheme, the government forces the intermediaries to
take an unknown number of nonviable enterprises along with
the viable ones. In this scenario, if the intermediaries are free
to behave as ordinary owners of capital, they will simply let the
nonviable companies fail. However, if the government imposes
a regulatory regime to avoid these mass failures, it will likely
destroy the intermediaries' effectiveness as agents of genuine
restructuring. For instance, by providing subsidies the state
will signal to the intermediaries that the safest source of income lies not in the strenuous task of restructuring, but in
extracting increasing amounts of money &om the state coffers.
Thus, the state will be open to the opportunism of the financial
institutions.
However, this outcome may be avoided if the privatized
enterprises are allocated to the intermediaries through an
auction. A competitive bidding procedure will reveal the extent
of the capital stock problems in advance of irrevocable decisions, thus allowing the state t o determine how the resulting
dislocations should be handled.g

9. The design of an auction to be used in this context is a very complex
matter which transcends the scope of this paper. For some of our suggestions, see
Roman Frydman & Andrzej Rapaczynski, Evolution and Design in the East EuropePROCESSES IN E A ~ REUROPE:
N
THEORETICAL
FOUNan fiamition FWVATIZATION
DATIONS AND EMPIRICAL
RESULTS
(Luigi Paganetto & Edmund Phelps eds., 81
RMS-A DI P O ~ I CECONOMICA
A
63, (1991)).
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An auction offers many advantages as an allocative mechanism. First, potential managers of the intermediaries are likely
to have varying skills: some may specialize in certain types of
companies, others may have particular foreign business contacts, still others may be good a t liquidating businesses and
selling their assets. Under the auction system, each manager is
able to tailor the selection of the companies in his fund's portfolio and the extent of the f i s investment in any company to
suit his expertise. This would be impossible in a mechanical
allocatim of shares. By allowing such preferences to be reflected in the ultimate allocation, the auction would thus properly
match the skills of the individual fund managers with the
needs of the economy.
The second advantage of an auction is that it forces the
managers of the intermediaries to seriously research the companies which will be privatized. If a list of such companies is
announced a few months before the auction, every fund manager will know that his h t u r e success depends to a large extent
on the wisdom of his initial assessments. Therefore, each Eund
manager will find out as much as possible about the enterprises, particularly those in which he may have some competitive
advantage. As a result, a necessary precondition of genuine
restructuring--the preparation of plans which will turn around
the privatized enterprises--will begin in earnest immediately
after the auction is announced.
In other words, the inclusion of a well-designed auction in
a privatization plan will immediately engage the private sector
in a competitive process of information gathering, the results of
which will also become available to the government. Unlike the
endless enterprise valuations commissioned by the Eastern
European states, the research here will be done by businessmen and entrepreneurs who will be backing their estimates
with investment decisions.1° While no valuation of post-Communist enterprises can be completely reliable (because the level
of uncertainty is simply too high), these entrepreneurial estimates are probably the best possible.
From the government's perspective, the most important

10. Also, the valuations will be simpler because the prospective fund managers,
looking to purchase the shares of the privatized enterprises with otherwise worthless vouchers, will try to assess the enterprises' relative value (i.e., to rank them
with respect to one another), rather than determine their monetary worth (which
makes it necessary to compare them with all other potential investments).
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information resulting from the auction will be the number of
enterprises that the fund managers believe have no potential
for recovery." This information will provide the government
with a relatively good estimate of the extent of the worthless
capital stock in the state sector. Since these worthless enterprises will be left under state control, the state will be able to
make the appropriate decisions as to their f d disposition
without risking a shock wave of plant-closings and unemployment, and without compromising the restructuring of enterprises with potential.
Confident that the intermediaries will consider their new
acquisitions to be of value, the state can give the funds full
responsibility for the companies in their portfolios and refuse to
subsidize them in any way. The state can adopt a number of
policies to deal with the companies in its possession, which will
avoid destabilization and social unrest. The state may decide to
pay off the debts of some of the enterprises and auction them
again later, or it may give them to the workers. Another option
would be to subsidize them temporarily in some other way and
proceed with a staggered program of closures, so that the unemployed can gradually be absorbed by the newly developing
private sector. The state could even put the "white elephants"
into special liquidation funds, to be auctioned off to those who
would undertake to manage them for the lowest subsidies. In
all of these cases, the good enterprises would be separated from
the bad, and a continuation of some subsidies would not endanger the restructuring of the whole economy.
2. The speed of privatization
Much of the discussion regarding the speed a t which Eastern European privatization should proceed is misguided. Those
who say that the state should privatize everything immediately
have no real appreciation of the political and social problems
that might result from a sudden string of bankruptcies. However, the proponents of a more gradual process usually underestimate the difficulty that the restkcturing will encounter if the
state remains in control for too long and new vested interests
develop a hold over the process of privatization.

11. If there is only one bidder for a given enterprise, a well-designed auction
might give it to that bidder at no cost. Thus, if no one bids for an enterprise, it
means everyone thinks it has negative value.
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The answer to the question 'Wow fast?" needs to be more
nuanced than "fast" or "slow." Those enterprises that are capable of being privatized, i.e., those which are either viable in a
competitive environment or could be profitably liquidated,
should be privatized immediately. Those which are not viable
and require a period of transition should be dealt with differently, and not closed down overnight. The problem is how to
distinguish the former from the latter. The solution is a welldesigned auction system 8s a component of the privatization
program. An auction will reveal important information at the
outset of the reform process and allow for necessary subsequent
modifications.

B. Transaction Costs
The problem with the capital stock in Eastern European
economies has another, more complex, dimension which has not
received proper attention. The very nature of the planned economy contributed to the creation of links between enterprises.
These links may make them incapable, or a t least much less
capable, of functioning within a market economy.
One of the fundamental features of a market economy is
the considerable amount of duplication among firms in a given
branch of production.12 Although this duplication of firms encourages innovation and flexible responses to consumer demands, the central planner considered it wasteful and messy
since it undermined his desire to simplify the center's chain of
command. Moreover, a socialist enterprise never faced the
possibility of losing the demand for its products since its "customers" were captives within the planned economy. Consequently, each firm in the command economy occupied a specific
"niche," and there was very little incentive to organize f m s as
genuinely independent units.
Therefore, unlike a market economy in which vertical integration or other forms of common organization always have
their cost in terms of diminished flexibility and the loss of
alternative competitive sources of supply,13 the extent of inte-

12. For the role of duplication in the capitalist economies, see RICHARD
R.
NELSON& SIDNEYG. WINTER,
AN EVOLUTIONARY
THEORYOF ECONOMIC
CHANGE
(1982); Richard R. Nelson, Capitalism as an Engine of Progress (unpublished paper,
on file with authors); and Richard R. Nelson, Why Do Firms Differ and How Does
It Matter? (unpublished paper, on file with authors).
13. For a discussion of the advantages and limits of vertical integration in the
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gration in a socialist economy is not limited by any factors
beyond administrative convenience." Thus, each unit of production becomes rigidly fitted within the plan, and to the extent the system provides incentives to produce more efficiently,
individual units develop as many synergies as possible with
their immediate suppliers and the recipients of their outputs.
As a result, each unit invests very heavily in "niche specific"
assets. This asset specificity makes i t very difficult for the firm
to function in another environment.
If this analysis is correct, the transition to a market economy may entail staggering costs. In fact, if privatization separates the purely administrative units of the Communist economy and forces them to sink or swim on their own, the
economy's initial performance may deteriorate to even lower
levels. The new companies would be hard pressed to fmd new
markets for their very specific goods. Additionally, they would
naturally tend to continue their old associations with their
partners in the socialist chain of production. However, in addition to resisting genuine transformation, they would now try to
renegotiate the terms of their old relationships in order to gain
as many advantages as possible under the new circumstances.
The transaction costs of these negotiations would be high. In
fact, as the f m s attempt to exploit their mutual dependence,
the cooperation among the old partners would likely be less
smooth and more wasteful than ever.
A partial solution to these problems may be provided by a
proper mechanism for allocating the privatized companies to
the intermediaries. A well-designed privatization auction can
reduce the problems that would arise from enterprises taking
advantage of their "niches." An auction allows the intermediaries to choose the companies in their portfolios. Therefore, the
intermediaries can acquire interests in companies with special
capitalist economies, see OLIVE% E. WILLIAMSON,
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES:
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); and OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
TIXI?,
ECONOMIC
I N ~ O NOFS CAPITALISM
(1985). For an alternative approach to the
same issues, see Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart,
Costs and Benefits of
Ozunership: A A o r y of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J . POL. ECON.691-719
(1986).
14. For an analysis of the theory of the firm in a centrally planned economy,
see J6zef Zieleniec, Microeconomic Categories in Different Economic System: The
F i n , in OPI'IMAL DECISIONSIN lhhRKEm AND PLANNED ECONOMIES1 (Richard E.
Quandt & Dugan T1ciska eds., 1990). For a claim that one could talk about the
INSTITUwhole command economy as a single firm, see P.J.D. WILES, ECONOMIC
TIONS COMPARED
39 (1984).

links to one another and prevent these companies from exploiting each other. To the extent that these links are genuinely
efficient, common ownership will protect and improve them,
sometimes to the point of full-fledged mergers. If, however,
these links have no beneficial long-term effect, the common
owners will ensure that the firms are weaned from one another
and that they develop relations with new customers and suppliers. However, this weaning will be gradual, and the exploitative opportunities will be accordingly diminished. In this context, the auction does not serve to reveal information, but rather to trigger a selfcorrection mechanism.

C. Financial Infrastructure
One of the main obstacles to further development of the
post-Communist economies is the absence of a genuine banking
system and the necessary capital markets. Since it may be
diffcult to create these institutions quickly, financing the development of the post-Communist economies is bound to be
problematic. This problem also bears on the choice of a privatization strategy.
Banking reform in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland
and Czechoslovakia, is in its infancy. Until recently, banking
was completely centralized, with commercial banking being
handled by the central bank. The central bank was merely an
instrument of state planning and control, and its importance
grew as other central planning institutions relinquished some
of their direct power over the enterprises. In its expanding
capacity, the central bank, through its local branches, was
supposed to ensure that the enterprises maintained the balance
among investment, wages, and working capital that the state
considered desirable.
Post-Communist reforms in Poland and Czechoslovakia
divided the central banks into a number of independent institutions and attempted to introduce some commercial realism into
enterprise financing. However, in practice, reforming the banks
has not produced a significantly more rational system. Even
now, large state enterprises of dubious viability can obtain
signdicant amounts of credit (with which they continue to
maintain high levels of employment and postpone radical managerial changes), while the new private sector, with its very
thin capitalization, is unable to obtain affordable financing. It
seems quite likely that without the entry of a s i w c a n t foreign component in the banking area, the reform of the financial
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infrastructure of the Eastern European economies will be seriously retarded.
In this connection, one of the most promising but controversial features of mass privatization plans which involve intermediaries is the intermediaries' potential to finesse the existing
banking system and provide the germ of a new fmancial order.
Privatization strategies involving intermediaries are often criticized for the high transaction costs they generate. In these
plans, many individuals (perhaps every citizen) must receive
notice of their new entitlement and an explanation of how the
system works. In addition, the funds themselves must be set up
and managed, which requires the establishment of a separate
account for each of the participants. Since each participant's
share may be of small value, administrative costs might consume a large portion of the proceeds.
Governments are therefore looking to reduce the administrative costs of the new order, perhaps by "piggybacking" their
mass privatization schemes on existing mechanisms, such as
social security registration. However, it might be worth incurring the somewhat higher initial transaction costs of certain
proposals in order to lay the foundations for new financial
institutions. Since the intermediaries would have to open and
maintain individual accounts for a very large number of people,
it might require very limited additional expense to link these
activities with other types of services usually associated with
consumer banking.
Similarly, the intermediaries' restructuring role has close
affinities with brokerage, commercial, investment, and merchant banking operations, as well as with insurance. The funds
could thus provide the following services: lenders or agents in
borrowing (arranging loans or floating commercial paper on
foreign financial markets), agents in the sale of stocks or assets, and representatives (and perhaps financiers) in arranging
joint ventures with foreign investors, insurers, and capital
pools for channelling small savings into the growing economy of
a country with a shortage of capital.
In other words, the intermediaries could develop into ''universal banks," similar to those in Germany or Japan. Given
their flexibility, such institutions would be an attractive prospect for Eastern Europe. However, their development would
also raise concerns regarding the influence such fmancial giants could exercise on the fledgling political systems of Eastern
Europe. Therefore, any decision to move in this direction
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should be made carefully. If such a financial infrastructure is
adopted, a system of safeguards should be implemented in advance to limit inappropriate iduences.

D. The Role of Government
The quality of the civil service is another factor limiting
the scope of successful reforms. The old bureaucrats were appointed based on their political reliability and lack of personal
independence. The new governments have started to replace
the old personnel, but the process is slow, and the new people
are often without much experience, especially when the required expertise involves familiarity with business transactions. Consequently, it should not be surprising that civil service in Eastern Europe will need as much painstaking and time
consuming rejuvenation as industry and the service sector. Furthermore, even in those areas in which government policy in
the more stable countries of the West may successfully complement the market, there is serious doubt that the Eastern
European bureaucracies could be trusted to achieve similar
results. Therefore, privatization proposals must be evaluated
with the idea of economizing on governmental expertise.
No easy substitute for governmental regulation exists
which can provide a clear set of the "rules of the game." Yet,
the very idea of the intermediaries is to remove the state as
much and as soon a s possible from managerial decisions, espe. cially from the management of the privatization process itself.
Thus, the intermediaries can be charged with such matters as
selling and liquidating state enterprises and managing the
government holdings.
This idea of "privatizing privatization" is particularly important given the low quality of government services in Eastern
Europe. And yet, perhaps because many economists are not
accustomed to thinking about political actors in terms as sophisticated as those they use with respect to economic agents,
many privatization proposals ignore or minimize the limitations of the available governmental machine.

VI. THE MAINDANGER
IN MASS PRNATIZATION
PROPOSALS
The intermediaries created during a mass privatization
plan of the type considered here are potentially very powerful
and influential institutions. Their power, like all power, could
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easily be abused. Thus, it is important to curb this power by
carefully attending to the incentives that the fund managers
will have in the still largely unknown environment of the future Eastern European economies.
The intermediaries' managers face a basic choice of strategy: whether to position their funds as primarily economic or as
primarily political agents. The first strategy is to prevail over
one's competitors in restructuring to enhance the value of the
privatized companies and to profit from their expansion. The
second strategy is to collude with the other funds, to divide the
markets by mutual agreements, and t o increase revenues by
fxing prices, extracting rents from public officials, and entrenching a complex system of state subsidies. This second
alternative is the greatest danger posed by the mass privatization programs.
All mass privatization proposals that include intermediaries involve this danger. Competition and restructuring is arduous and fraught with perils and uncertainties for the manager
who undertakes it. Genuine restructuring also means that the
fund will encounter considerable hostility &om those who are
dislodged from positions of influence and control. Therefore, it
is quite likely that an alliance of disgruntled special interests
will attempt to use available channels of political influence to
produce a new wave of state interventionism in Eastern Europe. The ability of the fund managers to resist these political
pressures may be limited by their foreign connections and by
the xenophobic attitudes present in all Eastern European societies. The charge of selling out to foreigners has the ability to
destroy an intermediary's truly competitive strategy.
In contrast, to be a monopolist and a rent seeker can be
extremely attractive to a fund manager. Eastern Europe has a
long tradition of government paternalism, and forty years of
communism have only advanced this philosophy. In addition,
there are innumerable ways in which fund managers may associate the government with their own performance and shift to
it some responsibility for their own failures. The intermediaries
will have considerable resources at their disposal, while the
governments will be temporarily ill-equipped to r e d a t e the
system. Thus, the funds may find it easy to manipulate the
governmental agencies responsible for their regulation. Tariffs,
subsidies, monopolies, and other evils would surely follow.
Once entrenched, a system of this kind would be very dacult
to eradicate.
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OF THE INTERMEDIARIES
AND
VII. THE GOVERNANCE
THEIRENVIRONMENT

There are many ways in which reformers can attempt to
prevent the fund managers from degenerating into rent-seekers; indeed, most of the program design questions concern this
issue in one way or another. This section discusses some of the
main concerns.

A. Internal Governance
The corporate governance structure of the intermediaries
will play an important role in determining their behavior. The
intermediaries are likely to be organized as domestic companies
in the countries in which they will operate. Since foreign managers will probably dominate these companies, the authorities
might try to make the fund's manager responsible to a board of
directors representing local interests. Unfortunatdy, the real
owners of the intermediaries, the shareholders, cannot be expected to exercise their powers directly. Each fund might be
owned by millions of people who will face insuperable collective
action problems in trying to control the funds they own. Indeed,
the very inability of the funds' owners to be actively involved in
monitoring their property is responsible for the existence of the
intermediaries in the first place.
1. Boards of directors
If the intermediaries' shareholders cannot be expected to
monitor their performance, it might be difficult to find an appropriate substitute for them on the funds' boards of directors.
For example, the reformers may be tempted to advocate political appointments to the intermediaries' boards of directors.
This would ensure that the board would be more responsive to
special interests than to the interests of the shareholders.
Therefore, the best corporate governance structure is one in
which the directors "represent" no one in a strict sense, but
have a personal interest themselves in monitoring managerial
performance. The idea of "independent directors," used in the
United States, seems appropriate.
The role of the board of directors is also a matter of more
general concern. If the intermediaries are to be genuinely entrepreneurial, business-oriented institutions, their management, chosen for its experience and foreign contacts, must be
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primarily responsible for the policies of the fund. The board of
directors should be a reactive body, guarding the interests of
the shareholders against managerial abuses. If, on the other
hand, the board's role is viewed as more active with respect to
policy formulation and interferes with what are essentially
business decisions, the board is likely to decrease the funds'
effectiveness and to inject into its objectives a number of special-interest aims, unrelated to the maximization of returns on
investment.
2. Compensation
The design of the intermediaries' compensation structure is
another crucial aspect of the properly competitive character of
their activities. A compensation system is extremely difficult to
devise, especially in the absence of financial markets which
would help determine the value of the assets under the
intermediaries' management and thus also allow for a proper
evaluation of their performance. However, the tying, even
though imperfect, of the fund managers' compensation to their
performance is a fundamental feature of every healthy incentive structure.15
It is also important to determine the extent to which the
state should regulate the fund managers' compensation. While
it is quite clear that the state should regulate the compensation
structure (so as to ensure a proper set of incentives), the regulation of the compensation size (by, say, fixing it at a certain
specific percentage of the funds' assets or of some other
benchmark values) should, if possible, be left to the market.
Not only will this increase competitive pressures, but it will
also avoid signifkant mistakes. For example, if the state sets
it is exthe amount, rather than the type, of ~o&~ensation,
tremely unlikely that it will get the numbers "right" (i.e., so
that only transfer earnings and no rents are included). Furthermore, if the state sets the amount of compensation too low, the
appropriate actors &ll not enter, and if the compensation is set
too high, the h d s will derive unnecessary superprofits (rents).

15. Making the compensation in part dependent on the value of the
intermediaries' own shares m y introduce a dose of competition for clients on
whose behalf the funds manage the privatized companies.
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B. The Intermediaries and the State
One of the surest ways to convert the intermediaries into
essentially bureaucratic institutions is to associate their activities with those of the state, and to make them dependent on
the state for their existence and functioning. Foreseeable consequences of such an arrangement include the following: a dramatic reduction in the fund's readiness to make decisions on
the basis of ordinary business principles, the fund's reluctance
to take risks, and above all, the fund's security in the assurance that the state, closely identified with the intermediaries in
the minds of the public, would have to come to their aid if either they or the companies in which they were heavily invested
were ever in financial jeopardy.
1. Control of entry

The way the intermediaries are formed is a decisive factor
in determining their relation to the state. If the state creates
funds (as would be the case, for example, if the state were to
determine their number and composition), the state will be
associated with their success or failure from the very beginning. Knowing this, the funds may exploit the state's vulnerability and extract concessions by threatening to produce economic effects which the authorities would find difficult to counter. However, if the intermediaries' entry is essentially free (as
would be the case, for example, if anyone satisfging some minimum regulatory conditions could create an intermediary), both
the intermediaries' rent-seeking behavior and the degree of the
state's association with the intermediaries would be reduced.
2. Regulatory structure

The state regulations covering the intermediaries will also
play an important role. Some regulatory scheme must exist to
protect the shareholders from managerial overreaching and to
control self-dealing, insider trading, and other corrupt practices. But this same scheme might also put bureaucrats firmly in
control and force the funds to concentrate more on capturing
the bureaucracy than on the restructuring process itself. To
minimize bureaucratic interference, it might be safer to rely
more on disclosure requirements than on complex approval
procedures and outright prohibitions. Also, the reformers may
want to structure the monitoring agencies as basically prosecu-
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torial, with the courts serving as the ultimate enforcers, rather
than creating powerfid rulemaking bodies which might be more
intrusive and easier to capture.
3. State ownership
Many privatization proposals envisage the states retaining
a substantial portion of the shares of the privatized companies
for budgetary and other reasons. However, to the extent that
the state remains a serious player as a partial owner of the
companies in the intermediaries' portfolios, political behavior
by the intermediaries remains a dangerously attractive option.

C. The Relation to the S m l l Investor
The main question regarding small investors is whether
they later would choose the intermediaries in which they invest
or whether they would automatically receive a certain number
of various intermediaries.

1. Consllmer choice and free entry
There are advantages to not giving the beneficiaries, at
least initially, the right to choose the intermediaries which they
are going to own. The reasons for these restrictions are always
the same: administrative simplicity, which eliminates transaction costs involved in other solutions, and the informational
barriers facing small investors which would limit their ability
to avail themselves of the benefits of choice.
A decision to restrict consumer choice in these matters,
however, has very serious costs. Without consumer choice, the
state must allocate the shares, and there is no opportunity for
free entry of the intermediaries.
The only practical way of assuring the free entry of the
intermediaries (subject to the fulfillment of some minimum
qualification requirements) is to distribute privatization vouchers. The funds would then use these vouchers to acquire the
shares of the privatized enterprises. However, if the consumer
is given no control over the choice of intermediaries in which
he will "invest", the entry of the intermediaries must be a function of a state decision. This will make the state seem responsible for allowing some institutions to enter. Such a certification
might make it very difficult for the state to avoid the blame if
some of the funds do not perform well in the future. The very
awareness of this might make the state regulate the funds
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more intrusively, and the fund managers will be more likely to
rely on subsidies than entrepreneurial success.
2. Limiting the class of beneficiaries
Given the importance of the free entry which is precluded
by an administrative allocation of the shares to the population,
it might be better to look for other ways to reduce the transaction costs of the allocation. Perhaps the best solution is to place
a limit o n the number of beneficiaries (as is planned in the
Czechoslovakian version of this program) by making the recipients pay a relatively small amount of money for the vouchers
to be distributed.16 In addition to reducing transaction costs,
this solution may also make it possible to achieve a much higher level of interest among the b d s ' shareholders, a higher
level of information, and perhaps even a sufficient concentration of holdings for more active shareholder involvement in the
governance of the funds. Finally, the smaller number of shareholders (each of whom would invest in a fund of his or her own
choice) would allow each fund to develop more extensive relations with its shareholders. For example, the funds may provide other financial and banking services which may contribute
to the development of the badly needed modern banking sector.

D. Portfolio Allocation
This paper has already discussed ways in which the method of allocating the privatized companies to the intermediaries
might affect the success or failure of the mass privatization
plans. In addition to these considerations, allocation method
will also affect whether the funds will be primarily political or
economic agents. If the allocation is administrative, the intermediaries are likely to focus from the outset on political influence. If the allocation is mechanical, with secondary trading
relied upon t o differentiate the portfolios at a later stage, the
cash-strapped funds are likely to enter into collusive agreements to redistribute their portfolios, rather than compete with
one another in lengthy trade-offs in an extremely thin market,
involving perhaps a total of ten participants. In both cases, the
state will associate its own prestige and responsibility with the
type of assets in each fund, again opening the possibility for
16. The size of the payment could be adjusted to arrive at the "right"number
of shareholders for each fund.
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future exploitation by the funds. If, however, the allocation
proceeds through an auction, from the outset there will be more
competition and less collusion.

E. The Relation to Foreign Financial
Institutions
Most commentators note the crucial importance of the
entry of foreign capital and expertise into Eastern Europe. For
a number of reasons, the entry of foreigners in their capacity as
investors presents serious political problems, while their entry
as advisers is of very little use.
However, the entry of foreign financial institutions in connection with the setting up and running of the intermediaries
in the privatization program is particularly appropriate for
three reasons. First, foreign expertise may be critical in establishing the infrastructure of a modern capitalist economy since
the Eastern Europeans have practically no experience at all.
Second, this infrastructure is particularly important because its
presence liberates market forces, facilitating a chain reaction of
growth and development. Third, the foreigners will initially be
entering here primarily as managers of the funds, working on
behalf of the local owners of the underlying assets, rather than
as buyers of East European industry (although some part of
their compensation may, and should, include stock options).
Since the foreigners' success would directly increase the value
of equity in local hands, their presence might be more acceptable than under other circumstances. Moreover, if the relations
between the funds and their shareholders are structured in
such a way that the assets under the intermediaries' management are directly proportional to the number of local citizens
who choose that h d , the degree of foreign influence could be
seen as exactly proportional to the welcome of the local population.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As the reform process in Eastern Europe unfolds, it is
becoming more apparent that price liberalization alone will be
insufficient, and that privatization is crucial. Furthermore,
spontaneous developments alone cannot be relied upon. A careful design is necessary to anticipate the aggregate effects of
mass privatization programs in economies with virtually no
reliable information regarding the state of their capital stock
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and with no developed financial institutions to support a market economy.
However, the dearth of important information also means
that all designs involve serious risks of highly negative economic and political consequences. Therefore, only a proper combination of design and reliance on market mechanisms will allow
for a successful transition. The role of the market mechanisms
is particularly important in revealing the lacking information
and reducing the levels of uncertainty. These market mechanisms can also help avoid the dangers inherent in administrative and bureaucratic solutions and permit the creation of specially designed institutional "checks and balances" and other
self-correctingmechanisms in the privatization design.

